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Mental representation : a reader

This collection of new and previously published essays focus on one of the major topics in contemporary philosophy: naturalistic theories of mental content. The volume brings together papers written by some of the most distinguished theorists working in the field today. Authors contributing to the volume include Jerry Fodor, Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, Ned Block, Robert Cummins and Daniel Dennett. Following the editor's introduction and several essays surveying the field, the book provides articles offering theories of mental content. Following each of these articles is a critical discussion of the theory presented. Critical commentators for the volume include Terence Horgan, Barry Loewer and Lynne Rudder Baker. The volume is intended for use in upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. It should also be of use to professional philosophers and cognitive scientists.This volume is a collection of both new and previously published essays focusing on one of the most exciting and actively discussed topics in contemporary philosophy: naturalistic theories of mental content. The volume brings together important papers written by some of the most distinguished theorists working in the field today. Authors contributing to the volume include Jerry Fodor, Ruth Millikan, Fred Dretske, Ned Block, Robert Cummins, and Daniel Dennett.One special feature of the volume is its format. Following the editors' introduction and several essays surveying the field are important articles offering theories of mental content. Following each of these articles is a critical discussion of the theory presented. Critical commentators for the volume include Terrance Hogan, Barry Loewer and Lynne Rudder Baker.The volume is intended for use in upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of psychology. It will also be of use to professional philosophers and cognitive scientists.

Mental Representation Volume 4.

It is supposed to be common knowledge in the history of ideas that one of the few medieval philosophical contributions preserved in modern philosophical thought is the idea that mental phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality, their directedness toward some object. As is usually the case Other such commonplaces about the history of ideas, especially those concerning medieval ideas, this claim is not quite true. Medieval philosophers routinely described ordina ...It is supposed to be common knowledge in the history of ideas that one of the few medieval philosophical contributions preserved in modern philosophical thought is the idea that mental phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality, their directedness toward some object. As is usually the case with such commonplaces about the history of ideas, especially those concerning medieval ideas, this claim is not quite true. Medieval philosophers routinely described ordinary physical phenomena, such as reflections in mirrors or sounds in the air, as exhibiting intentionality, while they described what modern philosophers would take to be typically mental phenomena, such as sensation and imagination, as ordinary physical processes. Still, it is true that medieval philosophers would regard all acts of cognition as characterized by intentionality, on account of which all these acts are some sort of representations of their intended objects. Mental Representation explores the intricacies and varieties of the conceptual relationships between intentionality, cognition and mental representation as conceived by some of the greatest medieval philosophers. The clarification of these conceptual connections sheds new light not only on the intriguing historical relationships between medieval and modern thought on these issues, but also on some fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind as it is conceived today.

Online EBSCO Academic Comprehensive Collection

Philosophy of mental representation

In Philosophy of Mental Representation five of the most original and important thinkers in philosophy of mind engage in an overlapping dialogue about mental representation. In new papers, contributors Andy Clark, Robert Cummins, Daniel Dennett, John Haugeland and Brian Cantwell Smith each investigate the views and claims of one of the other contributors regarding mental representation. The subject then offers a reply. An exciting feature of this collection is the dynamic discussion among all contributors following each exchange. This collection offers the latest thinking on mental representation carefully and critically analysed by the leading thinkers in the field.Five leading figures in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science debate the central topic of mental representation. Each author's contribution is specially written for this volume, and then collectively discussed by the others. The editor frames the discussions and provides a way into the debates for readers new to them.

Stanford Libraries receives major Black music collection, supporting new department and expanding possibilities for research