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1. Āk̲h̲ir kiyūn̲

   Kalāsarā, Raʼūf

   Islāmābād : Dost Pablīkeshanz, 2015. اسلام‌آباد : دوست پبلى‌کيشنز، 2015.

   Collected columns on politics and government of Pakistan; includes social conditions.

2. The role of opacity and transparency in achieving strategic stability in South Asia. [electronic resource].

   Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy. ; Oak Ridge, Tenn. : distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy, 2005

   According to international relations theory, deterrence can be used as a tool to achieve stability between potentially hostile nations. India and Pakistan's long history of periodic crises raises the question of how they can achieve deterrence stability. 'Transparency' describes the flow of information between parties and plays a key role in establishing a deterrence relationship. This paper studies the balance needed between opacity and transparency in nuclear topics for the maintenance of deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. States with nuclear weapons are postulated to implement transparency in four categories: potential, capability, intent, and resolve. The study applies these categories to the nuclear components of the ongoing India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue Working Group for Peace and Security including CBMs. To focus our efforts, we defined four scenarios to characterize representative strategic/military/political conditions. The scenarios are combinations of these two sets of opposite poles: competition - cooperation; extremism - moderation (to be understood primarily in a religious/nationalistic sense). We describe each scenario in terms of select focal areas (nuclear doctrine, nuclear command and control, nuclear stockpile, nuclear delivery/defensive systems, and conventional force posture). The scenarios help frame the realm of possibilities, and have been described in terms of expected conditions for the focal areas. We then use the conditions in each scenario to prescribe a range of information-sharing actions that the two countries could take to increase stability. We also highlight the information that should not be shared. These actions can be political (e.g., declarations), procedural (e.g., advance notice of certain military activities), or technologically based (e.g., seismic monitoring of the nuclear test moratorium).

   Online OSTI

3. Demilitarization of the Siachen conflict zone [electronic resource] : concepts for implementation and monitoring

   Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy. ; Oak Ridge, Tenn. : distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy, 2007

   Pakistani and Indian militaries have been occupying the Siachen Glacier and surrounding regions for decades. Although a cease-fire is in place, continued occupation carries the risk of an inadvertent conflict, which could escalate into a full-fledged nuclear-backed confrontation. Political and military analysts in Pakistan and India now question the strategic significance of the Siachen Glacier and agree that under the right circumstances, military withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier region would not adversely affect either state. The difficulty lies in conducting the withdrawal in such a way that neither side feels vulnerable, and in maintaining the demilitarization in a way that can be verified. In this paper, the authors who have both held command responsibilities in the Siachen Glacier region present a process for conducting and verifying the demilitarization of the Siachen Glacier region. The authors discuss the role of monitoring and verification tools and their relevance to this border zone of conflict.

   Online OSTI

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