Physical and digital books, media, journals, archives, and databases.
Results include
  1. Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility

    Pei, Harry
    Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2020

    We present a model for the equilibrium frequency of offenses and the informativeness of witness reports when potential offenders can commit multiple offenses and witnesses are subject to retaliation risk and idiosyncratic reporting preferences. We compare two ways of handling multiple accusations discussed in legal scholarship: (i) When convictions are based on the probability that the defendant committed at least one, unspecified offense and entail a severe punishment, potential offenders induce negative correlation in witnesses’ private information, which leads to uninformative reports, information aggregation failures, and frequent offenses in equilibrium. Moreover, lowering the punishment in case of conviction can improve deterrence and the informativeness of witnesses’ reports. (ii) When accusations are treated separately to adjudicate guilt and conviction entails a severe punishment, witness reports are highly informative and offenses are infrequent in equilibrium.

  2. Reputation With Strategic Information Disclosure

    Pei, Harry Di
    Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2016

    I study the dynamics of an agent’s reputation for competence when the labour market’s information about his performance is disclosed strategically by an intermediary. I show that this game admits a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). When players are patient, the agent’s effort is inverse Ushaped, while the rate of information disclosure is decreasing over time. I illustrate the inefficiencies of the unique MPE by comparing it with the equilibrium in the benchmark scenario in which the market automatically observes all breakthroughs. I characterize a tractable subclass of non-Markov Equilibria and explain why allowing players to coordinate on payoff irrelevant events can improve efficiency on top of the unique MPE. My model can be applied to professional service industries, such as law and consulting.

  3. Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values

    Pei, Harry Di
    Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2018

    I study reputation effects when players have persistent private information that directly affects their opponents’ payoffs. I examine a repeated game between a patient informed player and a sequence of myopic uninformed players. The informed player privately observes a persistent state, and is either a strategic type who can flexibly choose his actions or is one of the several commitment types that mechanically plays the same action in every period. Unlike the canonical reputation models, the uninformed players’ payoffs depend on the state. This interdependence of values introduces new challenges to reputation building, as the informed player faces a trade-off between establishing a reputation for commitment and signaling favorable information about the state. I derive predictions on the informed player’s payoff and behavior that uniformly apply across all the Nash equilibria. When the stage-game payoffs satisfy a monotone-supermodularity condition, I show that the informed player can overcome this new challenge and secure a high payoff in every state and in every equilibrium. Under a condition on the distribution over states, he will play the same action in every period and maintain his reputation in every equilibrium. If the payoff structure is unrestricted and the probability of commitment types is small, then the informed player’s return to reputation building can be low and can provide a strict incentive to abandon his reputation.

Guides

Course- and topic-based guides to collections, tools, and services.
No guide results found... Try a different search

Library website

Library info; guides & content by subject specialists
No website results found... Try a different search

Exhibits

Digital showcases for research and teaching.
No exhibits results found... Try a different search

EarthWorks

Geospatial content, including GIS datasets, digitized maps, and census data.
No earthworks results found... Try a different search

More search tools

Tools to help you discover resources at Stanford and beyond.